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Abstract: This article considers selected drivers of decision variability in child welfare 
decision-making and explores current debates in relation to these drivers. Covering the 
related influences of national orientation, risk and responsibility, inequality and poverty, 
evidence-based practice, constructions of abuse and its causes, domestic violence and 
cognitive processes, it discusses the literature in regards to how each of these influences 
decision variability. It situates these debates in relation to the ethical issue of variability 
and the equity issues that variability raises. I propose that despite the ecological complexity 
that drives decision variability, that improving internal (within-country) decision 
consistency is still a valid goal. It may be that the use of annotated case examples, kind 
learning systems, and continued commitments to the social justice issues of inequality and 
individualisation can contribute to this goal. 
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1. Decision Variability in Child Welfare 
Decisions made in response to the problems facing families have considerable consequences in 
child welfare social work. The frameworks informing such decisions are essentially frameworks of 
social meaning and, as such, are highly influenced by the social contexts within which they occur. This 
context is far from monolithic, as many factors combine in a complex and contingent web of 
influences that converge and conflict. Thus, decisions are the outcome of highly situated 
categorisations of meaning sourced from available discourses in the national, political, organisational, 
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professional, theoretical, technological, relational, material and personal environments. Such diverse 
and malleable social interpretations create a very complex context, and one outcome of this complexity 
is variability in decision outcomes. Drawing on a decision ecology approach, this article is a selected 
literature review of current research on several decision elements across the ecological spectrum. It 
discusses how they contribute to decision variability and why this matters [1,2]. It is not a systematic 
review in that it is not the result of a specific literature search and code technique; rather, the 
influences have been selected broadly based on current debates common in Anglophone contexts for 
their “reach” across the ecological spectrum. I argue that between-country variability is inevitable; 
nevertheless, it presents a major opportunity for critical examination of the impacts of various 
constructions of abuse, risk and family and their interactions with political contexts and policy 
orientations. In addition to this, within-country variability also exists. This represents an ethical 
problem, as general consistency at decision points across similar cases represents the universalist 
duties inherent in human rights and duty-based ethics.  
This article outlines the occurrence of decision variability, considers the ethical questions such 
variability provokes, then discusses a selected range of known contributors to variable decision 
outcomes. Inevitably, this leads to political considerations. Decision variability in child welfare social 
work ultimately reflects inherent tensions in the normative versus radical traditions of social work, 
conflicting methods of risk assessments and perceptions, differing attitudes on child welfare outcomes 
and epistemological conflicts about the nature of child abuse [3,4]. All of these aspects—ecological, 
ethical, psychological and political—are reflected in decision outcomes that can vary widely in terms 
of access to services, recommendations for statutory assessment and decisions to remove children and 
place them in foster care. Why does such variability exist, even within countries that have the same 
policy orientation to child welfare [5]? Is it a problem, and for whom? If it is, can it be resolved? This 
article addresses these questions. It begins by introducing decision-making concepts, outlines variability 
and discusses the ethical consequence of this. It then covers a range of selected issues impacting 
variability broadly organized ranging from the macro to the micro: policy orientations, risk, inequality 
and poverty, evidence-based practice, constructions of abuse and its causes and cognitive processes.  
2. Decision-Making: Rational and Consistent? 
Decision-making is not necessarily rational. Kemshall ([6], p. 216) suggests the rational actor 
paradigm, “… fails to acknowledge the importance of macrosociological and historical forces on the 
one hand, and non-rational, individual forces on the other”. She argues instead that all decision makers 
are “situated”, that their decisions are contingent upon the meaning making resources and priorities of 
their social context. Many studies seek to elucidate the complexities and lack of consistency in child 
welfare decision-making in practice. Such studies illustrate decisions at a range of points on the 
continuum from notification to a child protection service, substantiation, decisions to assess, to 
intervene, to remove and to return children. A range of studies show that many countries have variable 
placement or substantiation decision outcomes in response to the same or similar cases [1,7–11]. These 
differences have variously been related to ethnicity, risk perceptions, professional background, 
poverty, worker attitudes towards removal, the specific site office and family wishes, while others note 
that the presence of alternative care resources is also implicated in variable decisions [12–17].  
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For example, Forkby and Hojer [18] found that decisions to place children in residential care were 
shaped by several factors. Firstly, it was viewed by practitioners as a last resort option, and as the 
outcomes of it were unknown, this resulted in a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” position for 
the social worker. Removal as containing significant risk of harm has been shown elsewhere to result 
in a “weighing up of harms” by social workers, rather than a simple assumption of removal equates to 
safety position. This is especially so if the underpinning cultural preference is for family maintenance 
rather than removal [19]. Rossi et al. [20] compared the decisions of experts (academics, agency 
leaders, etc., n = 27) and frontline workers (n = 103) in response to real case summaries. They found 
that although all emphasised the same characteristics in the cases, these did not lead to uniform or 
consistent decisions. Instead, there was significant variability between both experts and workers spread 
across the spectrum from: close the case, offer ordinary services, offer family preservation services or 
remove. Experts were slightly more weighted towards the family preservation options, and the most 
influential case characteristic for removal was a prior record of abuse. Characteristics of the decision 
makers, such as gender or age, had little effect on decision outcomes [20].  
Britner and Mossler [21] compared different professionals’ responses to the same case using 
vignettes. These included judges, guardians, court advocates, social workers and mental health 
workers. They found that the professional discipline determined the decision outcome more than the 
content of the complaint. Social workers and mental health providers relied on information about the 
severity and pattern of abuse, information about services offered in the past and parental responses to 
those services. Judges and guardians ad litem tended to emphasise information about “the likelihood of 
a reoccurrence of abuse and the child’s ability to recount the abuse, whereas CASA (court advocate) 
volunteers rely on information about the stability of the family” ([21], p. 317). Arad-Davidson et al. [9] 
asked social workers about real decisions they had made via a questionnaire. They questioned them at 
two points in time and found that 21% of decisions, mostly to remove, had not been implemented in 
the six-month time period between the questionnaires. The reasons given were mostly either parental 
or child objections, particularly if the child was older or the worker was more experienced; however, 
all children whose mothers were drug or alcohol addicts were removed.  
Arad-Davison and BenBenishty [3] in another decision-making study of 200 social workers in Israel 
examined case worker attitudes via a questionnaire and compared them to responses to a vignette. 
Workers’ attitudes towards issues in child welfare (removal from the home of a children at risk, the 
ability of alternative care to foster children’s development, the optimal duration of alternative care and 
parent’s and children’s participation in the intervention recommendation) were compared with their 
risk assessments and intervention recommendations. They found that workers could be organized into 
“pro-removal” and “anti-removal” groups, via the questionnaire. They found that the former pro-removal 
group rated risk more highly and was more likely to recommend removal in response to the vignette 
family. They found that mother and child wishes had no effect on decisions and that social worker 
variables (such as experience) had no effect on which attitudinal group into which they could be 
categorised. Jergeby and Soydan [22] found that when comparing social workers’ responses to a 
vignette between and within countries, that even within countries, there was no evidence of 
standardised responses to the same situation.  
In Aotearoa/NZ, the rate of notification to substantiation ranges from 5% to 48%, depending on the 
location of the site office [23], and a recent qualitative workforce review of child protection services 
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noted the difficulties of establishing a clear and consistent threshold between NGO family support and 
statutory child protection intervention [24]. This review concluded that despite the assistance of 
assessment frameworks, decision-making protocols and legislation, that “…these sources were open 
for interpretation when determining whether or not the needs of a child or young person met the 
threshold for Child, Youth and Family assessment and intervention” ([24], p. 34). Also noted are the 
various impacts on social worker’s decision-making in a complex context, including public perceptions 
of the social worker role, the nature and duration of the actual concerns for the child, the practitioner’s 
own skill level and experience, the interface with other agencies providing services in local areas and 
the clarity of organisational messages and drivers ([24], p. 49). 
Thus, variability in decision outcomes reflects a range of influences across the ecological spectrum, 
far beyond individual characteristics [16]. These include site locations, professional discipline, 
attitudes toward family maintenance, underpinning beliefs about the possible harm of foster care and 
the organizational contexts of practice. These aspects highlight the situated actor Kemshall [6] speaks 
of in contrast to the rational actor, as these factors highlight the contingent and socially-influenced 
aspects of decision-making in real-life contexts. 
The Ethical Consequences of Variability 
Thus, decision outcomes are variable and influenced by cultural variations, some of which are to be 
expected. As child abuse is ultimately socially constructed, it is unsurprising that reactions to it are 
also variable in line with differing national contexts [4,25]. However, comparing why variations exist 
between countries is valuable. It draws our attention to connections between the macro and micro 
realms and enables critical examination of the taken for granted [26,27]. Examining internal variability 
is even more important. Internal variability in decision outcomes represents an ethical difficulty that is 
not easily resolved. Platt and Turney [28] offer a cogent critique of attempts to standardise threshold 
decisions on several counts: firstly, that the complex decision-making context involves numerous 
factors beyond the actual case characteristics or agency decision-making tool; secondly, that the 
worker’s own sense-making processes contain numerous aspects to do with cognitive processes, 
intuition emotion and values; thirdly, that neither linear, rational decision-making nor the use of 
heuristics and biases as “defective” are realistic appraisals of real-life decision-making. They also 
point out that the various types of abuse and varied circumstances it occurs in make comparing them in 
order to make a distinct “line in the sand” impossible. However, all of these critiques are directed at 
the difficulties of standardising decisions in terms of the real-world context, but do not address the 
ethical issues inherent in variability. Certainly, descriptive theories of decision-making should be 
complex and situated, rather than linear and “rational”, yet pointing this out does not resolve the 
ethical issues raised by decision variability.  
I contend that some kind of consistency in decision-making in regards to child protection  
decision-making should be attempted, however imperfectly, despite complexity. Why is consistency 
important ethically? As a statutory agency, the level of protection extended to children and the level of 
respect accorded to the parental rights of parents should not intersect at a line so malleable as to make 
the response of a statutory social work unreliable and arbitrary. If the macro factors (orientation) are 
held equal and the case facts are similar, deontological ethics (that is, that the same duties are accorded 
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to all clients based on their existence as humans with intrinsic value) would suggest that outcomes 
should be consistent [29]. Thus, either a child does or does not reach a threshold for out-of-home care 
or access to a therapeutic service. The home is or is not safe enough to warrant return. Decisions such 
as these should have some level of transferability within a nation state, as an expression of the 
commitment to maintaining both the duty of care to protect children equally and to respect the 
autonomy and guardianship rights of parents. Otherwise, the law is arbitrary.  
However, close studies of substantiation and other decision points do not conform to this 
expectation. As explained above and below, this issue is evident in many countries and represents 
several contributing influences. However, first, is this issue the ethical problem I have posed it as? It 
may be that variability, even within countries, is not quite the ethical problem I have posited. It could 
be argued that the research methods and ethical theories relied on to reach such a conclusion are 
inadequate. For example, most decision-making research is quantitative research limited to variables 
that are measurable and able to be manipulated, for example recorded case data or factors derived from 
factorial surveys using case vignettes. Many real-life variables that impact on decisions are not 
captured in either types of data, for example the in-depth, contingent and case-specific aspects, such as 
the social worker-client relationship, the reactions of both parents and children to the social worker, the 
perceived trustworthiness and caring attitude of the social worker toward the client and compliance. 
These variables are all found in qualitative studies to impact case decisions, albeit indirectly [30–32]. 
From an ethics of care perspective, some decision variability may not necessarily be negative, as such 
variability may reflect the type of relationship a worker and client family have. According to an ethics 
of care perspective (as opposed to a “duty” perspective), ethical decisions should not be determined 
solely by identifying one’s duties, but also by the context-dependent nature of the case and the 
relational or caring obligations that derive from it [33–36].  
An ethical decision in child protection, therefore, could be considered not only one that reflects the 
weighing up of universal duties to protect children and respect the self-determination rights of parents 
or the costs and benefits of possible courses of action (traditional justice approaches), but one that is 
contingent upon the nature of obligations derived from a caring and supportive relationship with the 
family. Thus, it may be that some variability reflects the different relational qualities in a case that are 
not captured by research methods comparing the surface facts of a case, but are ethically defensible. 
This conclusion may have some merit, yet it is not a complete resolution, as the fairness question 
remains, as do concerns regarding transparency. However, it does lend us a more nuanced 
understanding of the ethical component of this issue and leads beyond the more straightforward 
question of what drives decision outcome variability, to when is decision variability ethically justified 
and when is it not.  
3. Policy Orientations 
Therefore, what drives these decision differences? One driver in between-country differences is the 
policy orientation of the nation state. At the macro level, differences abound in the historical 
development of services; for example, Duffy and Collins [26] note that the historical contexts of the 
U.S. and Northern Ireland have led to differing emphases on legal, cultural and political aspects of 
child welfare. Gilbert et al. [5] outline the differences between the policy orientations of nation states, 
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deriving three main types: child protection, child welfare and child focussed. Others have examined 
the interrelationship between these orientations and decision reasoning, noting that the first leads to a 
focus on specific acts of abuse, the second locates the cause of problems in family needs, while the 
final one can result in a ‘child-centric’ practice that protects children’s individual rights and wellbeing, 
but may downplay family relationships [37–41].  
Policy orientations can be described as broad “flavour differences” in overall policy  
directions [5,37–39,42]. Within a child welfare orientation, the best interests of the child are closely 
linked to the interests of the family as a whole, and assessments include strengths, as well as 
difficulties. Its purpose is preventive, and the focus within this approach is to “…create those material 
and social conditions within which all children are given sufficient opportunities to reach their full 
potential” ([43], p. 2; [44]). Thus, a child welfare orientation offers a broad-based prevention policy 
framework, based on a long-term understanding of epidemiology, rather than focussing on a single 
risky event [45].  
Gilbert et al. [5] conversely characterise a “child protection” orientation as one that frames 
problems in individualistic and moralistic ways, directs legalistic and investigatory intervention types, 
promotes adversarial state-parent relationships and results in the use of mostly involuntary  
out-of-home placement. Fargion [43] adds to this description, stating that child protection orientations 
define children’s best interests narrowly in terms of children’s protection, reify ‘abuse’ as something 
objectively apprehendable and utilise standardised assessment tools. Significantly, she claims this 
approach “treats difficulties as signals of risks” ([43], p. 2). A further emerging direction is a “child 
focussed” orientation, one that directs policy focussed on promoting the rights and wellbeing of 
individual children; however, a significant downside of this orientation is that children can become 
viewed as entirely separate from the context of their social relationships [41].  
These three orientations thus shape policy frameworks, but the application of these orientations is 
not straightforward, with “mixed” orientations increasingly common [5,39]. Kriz and Skivenes [46] 
provide an example of this contrast, stating that “the American and English welfare systems provide 
social assistance to the most destitute, with a child welfare system that focuses on risks for children. 
This type of welfare system stands in contrast to the Norwegian social democratic welfare state, which 
provides universal services related to health and social welfare, many of which are aimed at families, 
and with a child welfare system that focuses on children’s needs as well as risks” ([47], p. 1867).  
Orientation frameworks shape decision-making by setting out the preferred aims and functions of a 
child protection system within national contexts. Variability often relates to clashes between these 
orientations, not only between nation states, but also within them. Kriz and Skivenes [47] for example, 
found that people in different national contexts, namely California, England and Norway, evaluated 
risk in the same case vignette differently, with Californians evaluating risk the lowest, then England 
and Norway. They found that the child welfare orientation in Norway could be attributed to an increase 
in perceptions of risk by Norwegian social workers, as the threshold for intervention is much lower 
when prevention is framed as a family support service provision aimed at preventing out-of-home 
placement. Of note were significant differences in the perceptions of which factors created risk for the 
children involved, as well as interesting findings that showed that the least regulated environment, 
Norway, produced the most homogenous types of reasoning around risk, while the other two contexts 
were more internally heterogeneous. They argue that this reflects not only different risk assessment 
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tools, but also the policy orientations and type of welfare state of each nation. Other studies have also 
tracked the congruence between policy orientations and decision-making, for example Khoo et al.’s 
study of Canadian and Swedish approaches to child abuse and Skivenes and Stenberg’s study of social 
worker responses to domestic violence [38,47–49]. Internal variability can also reflect these broad 
frameworks, as the study by Arad-Davidson and Benbenishty (described below) shows that internal 
variation along these same lines (child welfare/child protection orientations) impacts on decision 
variability about out-of-home care. 
Another aspect of decision variability is the disjuncture between official policy frameworks and 
how social work is actually practised. As Buckley argues, the two can be quite disparate, with real 
practice differing so markedly from espoused policy guidelines, that she questions whether it is an 
“ungovernable enterprise” [50]. Kriz and Skivenes [51] compared the ways that social workers in 
Norway, the U.K. and England responded as ‘street level bureaucrats’ to their policy contexts, that is, 
they managed the demands made of them by official policy and legal frameworks given institutional 
and financial limitations. This study highlighted that although many countries share similar 
commitments to the principles of the best interests and/or wellbeing of the child, family preservation, 
permanence and safety, that nevertheless, the degree to which governments focus on individual 
principles differs, and importantly, how social workers deal with the sometimes conflicting nature of 
those principles is quite a different matter. Such a high level of discretion can contribute to differences 
in decision outcomes. Pendulum swings in reaction to media reports can also shape practitioner 
responses in a manner that may diverge from official policies, as public opinion that swings from 
criticising too much removal to criticising family preservation attempts can drive decisions based on 
fear of public opinion, rather than in line with stated policy [12,52].  
Orientations, Risk and Neo-Liberalism 
Such studies highlight the culturally-defined nature of responses to child protection issues across 
national contexts, patterned by policy frameworks. These orientations clearly have some influence on 
across-country variability and internal variability as more countries adopt mixed orientations.  
Mixed orientations can be seen in conflicting legal imperatives, such as family preservation and 
children’s “best interests”, but other influences fuelling the fragmentation of ways of approaching 
decision-making may be the influence of neo-liberal ideologies and the impact of risk thinking. Risk 
hyper-sensitivity is particularly likely within a “risk society”. Beck’s [53] analysis of a risk society 
proposed that risk is increasingly perceived as ubiquitous, as people are more aware of risks than ever 
before. Whatsmore, risk is viewed as widespread and potentially catastrophic, and simultaneously, 
people are expected to guard against all possible risks to themselves [54]. Within a neo-liberal political 
system, this expectation is heightened. Neo-liberal ideologies focus broadly on reducing the role of 
government, individualising social problems and “responsibilising” both professionals and  
individuals [55,56]. This results in the spreading of responsibility for child welfare across NGOs and 
statutory services, common in neo-liberal environments focussed on economic efficiency and 
devolution of responsibility. As rates of referral to child protection services increase dramatically, 
intense pressure on child protection systems have led many countries to significantly reconstruct their 
service systems in these ways, particularly in the wake of the fiscal constraints imposed by the 
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worldwide recession. Such changes commonly focus on spreading the responsibility for child abuse 
responses beyond statutory agencies and introducing new technologies in attempts to make practice 
responses more systematised and targeted to those most at risk [57,58]. The state’s role moves from 
being a “social state” to a “facilitating state”, merely a coordinator of services, rather than a body 
responsible for their existence, functioning or resourcing [59]. This spreading of responsibility among 
multiple agencies may multiply the various logics and beliefs relating to the correct or proper role of 
statutory social work with children, as agencies have their own cultural beliefs, practices and tools to 
assess families. It may also produce an uneven impact on the practitioner’s level of risk aversion, as an 
increasingly accountable workforce reacts to the pressure to manage risks to the self in different ways, 
with some workers complying and others resisting [60]. Within such a system, the possibility is that 
social workers become focussed on lowering their own risk of future accusations of poor practice, 
rather than building durable and humane solutions for children and their families. Decision-making 
becomes framed as avoidance of risk rather than promotion of wellbeing or self-determination.  
Further, the professional knowledge and relationship focus of social workers are downplayed within 
a context driven by managerial and technical discourses, as are the radical traditions of social work [61]. 
One effect of this is that “this framing of social problems encourages those professions working on 
social problems to adopt an ‘inward-looking’ perspective that minimizes the connections between 
structural change and the manifestation of individual problems” ([62], p. 1023). Another is that 
targeting of “programmes” is considered the only solution to abuse, and universal, supportive services 
are eroded. Abuse itself becomes considered as an individual problem, to which the correct and proper 
response is the correction of parenting practices, rather than considering the ways that parent’s 
interactions with their children are shaped by their material and social resources. It can be reasonably 
concluded that where a social worker is positioned along the radical-normative continuum will drive 
decision variability in responses to risk in the context of neo-liberal states. 
4. Risk and Safety in a Risk Society 
Thus, how risk is conceptualised is another major driver of decision-making in Anglophone 
countries [6,63]. Indeed, risk assessment and its associated “risk logics” have become the focus of 
child protection systems nearly worldwide and, with it, an economic-rationalist assumption that risks 
are measurable, predictable and avoidable [57,64]. Considering risk assessment highlights two debates 
in decision-making: how risk assessment tools are derived and used and whether they include strengths 
or safety perspectives. Houston [65] states differences in ways of conceptualizing risk reflect 
objectivist, subjectivist and critical meta-theoretical paradigms, each with their own epistemology, 
ontology and axiology in relation to risk. One expression of an objectivist approach to risk, for 
example, has been in the development of risk factor science and related risk assessment tools.  
A concern about risk and a perceived need to identify and reduce risk has led to increasing research 
into risk factors, using longitudinal and quasi-experimental methods, to measure the effect sizes of 
different variables. These have been incorporated into risk assessment tools, often termed “actuarial” 
approaches to risk assessment work. While providing valuable information about patterns across 
populations and successful in some studies to predict future abuse, on their own, such methods have 
significant limitations for decision-making [65,66].  
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Limitations of decision tools exist for two related reasons—the method of quantification and the 
way they are used in the practice of decision-reasoning. Firstly, in terms of the production of risk 
factors via statistical correlations, they are neither “necessary nor sufficient” to predict abuse in the 
future [67], thus producing a high rate of “false positives” [68]. Secondly humans as decision makers 
are notoriously imperfect at incorporating accurate assessments of probability and effect sizes into 
decision-making [69]. France et al. [70] note this in social work when they state that while statisticians 
might understand the level of surety or otherwise are able to be infer it from statistical correlation, 
nevertheless, risk factors are often treated as if they can give certainty about future outcomes in 
practice [70]. Gillingham [12] and others have noted that practitioners may subvert the intention of 
structured decision-making tools to get the outcome they desire or use the language of risk to 
legitimate decisions they have already made on other grounds [71]. However, if used correctly, 
actuarial approaches can be combined with consensus or discretionary approaches to produce a more 
complete method of risk assessment than one or the other would alone, with some research 
demonstrating that actuarial approaches are more accurate in terms of the actual risk of future 
notification than professional discretion approaches only [72]. However, using them alone to decrease 
decision variability is undesirable, as many other factors in addition to future risk must be considered. 
Either way, in addition to actuarial knowledge, case-specific knowledge, a relationship with the 
family, understanding how risks change over time, theoretical underpinnings and ethical commitments 
are required to be able to make decisions related to particular families [72,73]. This is particularly true 
given that estimations of future harm are just one aspect of decision-making about children’s lives. 
While preferred within modernist economic rationalist paradigms that attempt to predict and control 
uncertain outcomes, the use of risk-factor approaches can fuel practice dominated by risk aversion and 
forensic investigatory-type approaches [64,74]. The development of strengths and safety-oriented 
perspectives have attempted to counter this deficit approach to risk assessment, arguing that searching 
for risk factors alone is neither accurate, fair, nor useful in a context of unequal power relations and 
where the ongoing relationship is the best hope for actual change in the family [75–77]. These 
approaches attempt to resist risk saturation by actively searching for and including aspects related to 
client safety and strengths. Initial research notes the impact on decision-making of the Signs of Safety 
approach as producing knowledge about clients in ways that retain moral subject positions for parental 
clients to occupy. This contributes to shared power and parental engagement, creates the opportunities 
for personal change and leads to decisions that are likely to be less risk averse [78]. In terms of 
decision variability, which tools are specifically adopted by different agencies is therefore a significant 
driver of differences in decision outcomes, as those using traditional risk assessment formats and those 
utilising strengths or safety-oriented tools may reach very different conclusions about the level of risk 
and, thus, the need for intervention. Safety-oriented tools are also more likely to open up different 
pathways for intervention, as they focus on creating an intensely collaborative relationship with 
families and utilising their own networks and resources, whereas traditional risk assessment methods, 
used in the context of targeting and resource efficiency, tend to use the assessment to determine who 
should receive evidence-based standardised programmes delivered by a third party.  
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5. Inequality and Poverty 
This leads us to consider the role of poverty in family lives, as how the impact of poverty is 
constructed by decision-makers is another major driver of differences in decision outcomes. An 
individualised focus can lead to a narrow evaluation of quantifiable and individualised risks, obscuring 
a major concern with the pervasive over-representation of those most socio-economically 
disadvantaged in child protection systems. An enduring correlation between poverty and abuse, while 
not deterministic, nevertheless raises questions about the relationship between poverty and abuse in 
terms of causality and ethical questions about child welfare intervention as a reflection of  
inequality [41,79–82]. Paxson and Waldfogel [83] in a large study found that an increase from 10% to 
15% of children living in extreme poverty was associated with a 22% increase in child abuse. Many 
others have found similar results [84]. However, interpreting these findings in decision-making 
contexts requires careful examination: “The experiences of those trying to parent in a profoundly 
unequal society are not interrogated rigorously enough in current responses, with causation and 
correlation confused in a highly abstract language that renders real people and their lives invisible 
and/or unintelligible” ([41], p. 5).  
In terms of decision-making, the connections between poverty, inequality and abuse are important 
for practitioners to grasp. However, how does one incorporate them in decision-reasoning? There is 
some evidence that social workers can become de-sensitised to poverty as an integral and seriously 
damaging aspect of client’s lives [85]. Other studies have found that poverty made no impact on social 
worker’s decision-making, although other markers of poverty, such as substandard housing, did [14]. 
While Stokes and Schmidt [14] point out that social workers should be considering the impact of 
poverty on the ability of families to care for children, particularly from an anti-oppressive standpoint 
that recognises the impact of macro-structural conditions on families’ lives, Moraes et al.’s study [86], 
while investigating a similar question and with similar findings, came to quite a different conclusion. 
Moraes et al. [86] used a representative sample drawn from the Canadian Incidence Study of reported 
child abuse and neglect. They found that over five indicators (case substantiation, provision of ongoing 
child welfare services, referrals to child and family support programmes, out-of-home placement, 
applications to child welfare court and police involvement), poverty had an extremely minimal impact 
(6%) on the variance in decision outcomes. Nor did a poverty index of the family’s circumstances, 
although, again, living in unsafe housing (perhaps a proxy for poverty) had some impact on 
substantiation of abuse, particularly in cases where there was no physical injury. They conclude that 
there is no evidence in this study that social workers act in a ‘discriminatory’ manner in relation to 
families living in poverty and posit this as a positive finding.  
As Keddell [87] notes, this contrasting interpretation of findings in relation to poverty in  
decision-reasoning is indicative of the intensely contestable nature of the definition of the social work 
role and the tensions practitioners must navigate: one must be aware of the oppressive nature of 
poverty and its impacts on parenting, but at the same time, resist judgemental and negative 
assumptions about parents in poverty. This dichotomy reflects the difference between reflection and 
critical reflection: the former encourages self-examination with a view toward eradicating 
discriminatory stereotypes, while critical reflection moves beyond this to include structural awareness 
of social problems in one’s assessment of a family, so as to recognise the interconnections between 
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family practices and structural conditions [88]. These two types of reflection have significant 
implications for decisions where poverty and child welfare concerns converge, as decisions reflect, at 
least partly, the practitioner’s evaluation of the culpability for, or source of, the problems facing the 
family. Without at least some inclusion of structural impacts, culpability lies only with parents. 
Decision variability may reflect these tensions. 
Despite the radical and critical traditions implicit in social work education, political changes in 
many countries (particularly Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) towards the individualisation of 
social problems in both welfare reform and child protection systems reconfigurations constantly cast 
social work as a micro-level profession sent to maintain control and regulation of the masses, rather 
than advocate for them [89]. Marston and McDonald [62] bemoan the de-politicisation of social work, 
arguing that recent neo-liberal developments of policy in many Western countries have resulted in a 
significant reconstruction of the social work role and, with it, the replacement of “…sociological and 
political-economy approaches to problems like poverty, and have instead opted for behavioural-economic 
understandings of human behaviour. The combined effect of these changes is to cast doubt on the 
knowledge and actions of social workers as political actors, particularly those social workers directly 
engaged in work that seeks to redress social injustice and to influence public policy” ([63],  
p. 1023). Interestingly, Moraes et al. also draw a link between attitudes toward poverty and decision 
reasoning, hypothesising that in “…nations where poverty is viewed as primarily an individual 
responsibility and income inequality is pronounced, child welfare measures may be more intrusive 
among poor than non-poor families. On the other hand, in nations where poverty is viewed largely a 
societal responsibility and income inequality is more moderate, child welfare professionals may be 
more egalitarian in their decision-making” ([87], p. 167). Thus, the challenge for social workers in 
increasingly neo-liberal climes is to incorporate poverty in decision-making beyond simply eliminating 
negative stereotypes towards poor families, but must continue to remain resistant to pervasive social 
discourses that cast the poor as primarily responsible for their own demise [90]. 
6. Evidence-Based Practice 
Likewise, while including known risk factors in decision processes is important background 
knowledge, current exhortations to make “better use of research” can result in a deterministic use of 
risk factors or an inappropriate weighting of them in decision reasoning. Many effect sizes are tiny or 
the relationships between factors indeterminate. For example, Appleyard et al. [91] found in their 
study examining the relationship between childhood abuse, adult substance abuse and victimisation of 
one’s own children that there were traceable relationships, but the effect size was small (0.26/0.19). 
Studies of the impact of young parental age at first birth, a commonly relied on risk factor, actually 
show that effects are mixed. Some show a clear correlation with maltreatment, but these effects are 
also influenced by lower economic status, lack of social support and high stress levels [92]. This 
means that the age at first birth may not be as influential as first thought, or, all of the above factors 
combine for the effect. However, when research is translated for practitioners, it is often 
oversimplified, so that the nuances involved are lost [41]. Thus, the use of research in practice can be 
used inappropriately, as when over-simplification is combined with natural tendencies to over-estimate 
effect sizes, the result can be too much emphasis on negative attributes [92]. These issues led Munro et 
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al. [67] to conclude: “The repeated exhortations to child protection services to predict and prevent 
maltreatment, and the associated blame when they fail to do so, should be replaced with more modest 
expectations” ([68], p. 70). Thus, while understanding broad population patterns in relation to risk 
factors is certainly important background knowledge, its use in ways that assume they confer certainty 
in any specific situation is misguided and may contribute to variability [93].  
7. Constructions of Abuse and Its Causes 
Alongside these macro influences of national orientation and changing conceptualisations of risk 
and evidence, other changes are also occurring in regards to child abuse definitions and understandings 
of the causes and consequences of abuse. Definitions of abuse are played out at the micro level, as the 
idiosyncratic nature of family circumstances and behaviour is often difficult to fit into formal 
definitions of abuse, or if it does, deciding at what point or threshold it is ‘bad enough’ for intervention 
is a slippery fish. As noted, child abuse is a socially-constructed phenomenon in terms of its meanings, 
definitions and social responses [94]. This is reflected in the changing definition of abuse for differing 
purposes, such as for research, practice or legal purposes [95], differences in social worker’s responses 
to the same cases, intense public debate as to the boundary line between physical punishment and 
abuse and beliefs about what constitutes reasonable care or “good enough” parenting [15,96–98]. 
Modern definitions of abuse cover a variety of types, and establishing their parameters in real-life 
situations remains difficult.  
Considering definitions and constructions of abuse leads to a serious consideration of the causes of 
abuse. Many system’s responses, drawing on a neo-liberal paradigm, propose that abuse is caused by 
psychological or criminal tendencies and, thus, prescribe systems of surveillance, control and sanction 
as ways of reducing and preventing abuse [99]. These changes, without responding to a wider range of 
abuse causes, risk factors and effects of abuse, remain partial, only targeting one aspect of abuse 
prevention (surveillance and prediction) and only the most severe types of abuse. Such responses 
assume that definitions of abuse are obvious, straightforward and its solutions are self-evident [100].  
In turn, decision-making itself is conceived of as correctly “recognising” abuse and categorising a 
family as “abusive” or “non-abusive”, rather than the more difficult holistic assessment of child and 
family needs, opinions and wishes. 
Risk factors, as discussed, cannot predict abuse with any accuracy. Profiling of the most serious 
offenders can result in effective prevention of secondary abuse and sometimes primary. However, the 
vast majority of families referred to child abuse services, as well as those for whom abuse is substantiated, 
have much more complex, diffuse and chronic issues, with strong relationships to structural conditions, 
rather than the innate pathology of individuals [67,101–103]. What is more, child deaths are extremely 
rare events that are not predictable, even when considering a high-risk population [93]. In the use of 
the predictive risk model in Aotearoa/New Zealand that tracked babies from birth over their first five 
years, the top two deciles of risk were 66% accurate; in other words, it also identified 34% of those 
deciles as a ‘high risk’ population that did not go on to become abusive [104]. Pritchard and colleagues 
found that those who killed children had several identifiable salient features, such as having a history 
of violence and being not biologically related to the children they killed. They conclude that: “The 
juxtaposed results indicate that the assailants’ problems are essentially psycho-criminological, 
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especially violence, rather than socio-economic, although poverty worsens most situations” ([101],  
p. 1403). However, such cases make up a tiny proportion of those referred to child protection services, 
even of the substantiated cases. In Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2012, for example, emotional abuse and 
neglect made up around 80% of substantiated cases, with the remainder physical and sexual  
abuse [105]. However, substantiated cases (18,595 distinct children) were, in turn, a tiny proportion of 
the total of 148,659 notifications (of which 57,766 were police notifications for domestic  
violence) [24,105]. In Canada, 85% of referrals to their child protection service can be categorised as 
chronic needs, while the remainder are urgent protection cases [106]. Thus, practice responses attempt 
to respond to both high-end perpetrators, who may well have individual psychological risk markers for 
serious physical or sexual abuse, as well as the much more common diffuse, chronic situations of a 
combination of mental illness, poverty, drug and alcohol addiction, discrimination and domestic 
violence [24,107]. Based on an assumption that the former type of abuse is what most abuse “is” 
(influenced strongly by media representations), there is a substantial mismatch between systems and 
services and the actual phenomena of child abuse [52]. Wolfe et al. [107] state the problem thus: 
“Child abuse is an event, not a uniform disorder, and therefore it is necessary to consider multiple 
causes that interact unpredictably. Notwithstanding the critical role of the adult offender, child abuse is 
rarely caused by a single risk factor. Although risk signs and indicators are present, it is still very 
difficult to predict who will become abusive and who will not—child abuse may emerge in any given 
family if the ‘right’ conditions exist. These causal conditions stem largely from the interaction of  
child, familial, and cultural influences, but it is not possible to predict with precision when they will 
occur” ([108], p. 35).  
The variety of psychological and social work theories, as well as theories of human development, 
constructions of childhood and what might constitute children’s best interests also impact on decisions 
about what counts as abuse and harm across the lifespan [108]. For example, conflicts arise when 
considering the line between punishment and physical abuse, which despite being criminalized in a 
number of countries, remains a contested areas as to what amount of force, with what intention, to 
what age child, over what period of time and combined with what other family factors constitute 
abuse; and if so, is it to the level of harm such that statutory intervention is required [3]? Likewise, the 
impact on neglect, particularly of poverty and mental illness, can make a finding of neglect difficult if 
the parent is considered not in reasonable control over the contributing circumstances. Each of these 
(definitions of neglect and physical abuse) may have considerable cultural dimensions, with child 
rearing practices differing markedly across ethnic and cultural groups. This leads to a consideration of 
the way that a variety of types of abuse impacts on decision variability. It is only in recent times that 
the vast array of harms to children have been categorized as “abuse”: neglect, physical abuse, sexual 
abuse and emotional abuse. Some of these are clearer than others in terms of the degree of social 
consensus on harm, including the research evidence. For example, Chan et al. [109] found that despite 
an assumption that professionals would have some kind of common, professional view on abuse and 
its consequences, it was found instead that their attitudes towards child abuse reflected their cultural 
backgrounds rather than a professional consensus. Such differences in the interpretation of child  
abuse illustrate the contested nature of child abuse. This must refract through the varied decisions of 
social workers.  
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Domestic Violence as the New Child Abuse 
A further major recent change in the construction of the child abuse definition has been the 
inclusion of domestic violence as a type of emotional abuse of children [110]. Increasingly, convincing 
research on the harm to children from exposure to or witnessing of domestic violence has led to its 
transformation from an issue primarily affecting adult victims, most commonly women, to also having 
child victims [111–114]. There is also evidence that in addition to exposure, domestic violence also 
has a high co-occurrence with direct abuse of children, with some estimates between 30%–60% [115]. 
This has led to interesting developments in the responses of child protection systems. In Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, for example, police callouts for domestic violence where children were present prompted a 
now-mandatory referral to child protection services. Due to this change, one third of families referred 
to child protection services each year come directly from Police (see above). As in other countries, this 
represents a challenge to child protection services, where the reconstruction of domestic violence as a 
new type of child abuse leaves a service more familiar with traditional types of abuse ill-prepared to 
intervene effectively [110,116,117], with either excessive criminalization or child removal having 
significant drawbacks [118–120]. 
Considerable collaboration across services is needed to respond in ways that effectively protect 
children from harm (and women) [121,122]. However as Hester [121] notes, this is difficult when 
child protection systems and women’s protection systems operate within very different paradigms, 
leading to conflict about the most urgent problem faced by families and, thus, how to intervene 
successfully [119]. Simply educating child protection workers about domestic violence, while a good 
start, is insufficient in establishing an effective and systematic response to this phenomenon, where 
both the values and knowledge of child protection and women’s advocacy services are needed to be 
included, combined with case-specific consultation in order for collaboration to be successful [123,124]. 
This issue presents considerable tensions for social workers, for whom the definitions and 
conceptualisation of domestic violence presents challenges for establishing decision consistency. How 
it should be coded (as emotional abuse or neglect), if it should be considered a risk to children at all 
and who is assigned responsibility for protecting children from it, all impact on decisions in relation to 
it. Skivenes and Stenberg [49] compared responses to two vignettes, one a neglect case and one a 
domestic violence case. They note that in response to a domestic violence case, that responses between 
the U.S. and the U.K. were similarly concerned with risk, and this may be due to the U.K. swinging 
towards a child protection orientation; although, in another type of vignette offered (neglect), they 
found much more of an emphasis in the U.K. on a family service or child welfare-type approach. They 
contend that this is due to the type of case and that this may show the impact of evidence-informed 
practice, as knowledge about the effect of domestic violence has a more established cross-national 
consensus than other types [49]. However, they found that despite the uniformity of views on domestic 
violence as constituting a risk factor, that marked heterogeneity again appeared in the reports of what 
action social workers would actually take in response to this risk.  
Another issue in responding to domestic violence in case decision-making relates to who is 
perceived as responsible for it. As other research shows, where parents are viewed as culpable, more 
intrusive decisions follow. A variety of studies show that women are perceived as “bad mothers” when 
they are faced with domestic violence in the child protection system, and this results in a deficit 
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mothering discourse that blames them for their predicament. In terms of decision-making, this can 
result in an ultimatum approach from child protection services of requiring women to separate from 
their partners or remove the children [125]. Where women are viewed as both responsible, yet holding 
little real control over the risk presented by their partner to both themselves and their children, 
intrusive decisions become constructed as justified [126]. In a study examining the ways child 
protection workers attributed blame in domestic violence cases [127] found that the presence of 
domestic violence increased worker’s perception of risk to children. Every construct they used in a 
factorial vignette approach showed that workers were more likely to view women as more culpable for 
exposing their children to harm than their partner, even though in every case, their male partner was 
the violence perpetrator. Thus, understanding how domestic violence is affecting decision variability 
requires an understanding of the ways blame, culpability and risk are understood in relation to domestic 
violence, as well as how child protection systems interact with other services in particular locations. 
8. Cognitive Processes and Group Decision-Making 
Finally, the variable ways in which all of these factors are used in decision-making highlight the 
known cognitive problems with decision-making. For example, the tendency of humans to make 
decisions based on the most vivid or recent piece of information [128], the lack of the computational 
ability of humans to consider and weigh up all relevant information, the effect of “frames” (the implicit 
contextual parameters of decisions) satisficing—taking the best available option rather than the ideal—
and the use of heuristics and biases, particularly the tendency to have a confirmation bias. Many of 
these dynamics can lead to an overconfidence in human judgement, particularly when people are 
forced to make decisions quickly, or the “latent conditions” under which they are forced to operate 
lead to negative decision “shapers” such as incomplete information and high uncertainty, systemic 
feedback errors, improper drivers (such as technical tasks rewarded, rather than family outcomes) or a 
lack of training [69,92,129,130]. However, slower consideration of relevant issues, combined with 
education about cognitive biases, can help reduce their impact [92,131]. Others argue that heuristics 
(short-hand rules of thumb derived from practice experience) are not necessarily problematic, but the 
complex use of short cuts in response to recognised patterns that are often correct when used in their 
specific environmental contexts. It is this proposition on which proponents of ecological rationality 
and naturalistic decision-making essentially rely [28,132,133]. Hogarth [134] extends these ideas to 
consider heuristics as an aspect of the intuitive components of decision-making, which together with 
analytic reasoning, make up decision processes [73]. He argues that the learning of “correct” heuristics 
as one part of developing sound intuitive reasoning must take place in “kind”, as opposed to “wicked” 
learning environments. A “kind” environment is one that “…provides timely feedback and allows the 
tacit or experiential system to shape practitioner responses. In contrast, ‘wicked’ learning environments 
provide misleading, or no, feedback resulting in unfounded practitioner confidence” ([134], p. 4). 
In terms of decision-making variability, therefore, a reliance on either individual practitioners or the 
immediate ecological context presents challenges for national consistency in decision-making, as 
individual differences in perceptions, as well as site differences and their varieties of latent conditions, 
frames and whether there is a kind or wicked immediate environment for the learning of intuitive 
heuristics (very similar to “practice wisdom” concepts in social work), may produce inconsistency 
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between locations. A child in one town, with its particular mix of available resources and site office 
systems and cultures, should not be afforded a different level of protection than the same child in 
similar circumstances in a different location, nor should the rights of parents be impinged upon 
differently. For example, one reason for the interaction between inequalities and child protection 
involvement may be the lack of supportive family resources in poorer neighbourhoods that leave few 
choices open to both NGO and statutory social workers than to use legal intervention; an 
understandable response and one entirely consistent with naturalistic decision-making, but not an 
equitable one. Establishing a fairer response to threshold decisions would highlight the increased need 
in some neighbourhoods for more family support services, rather than involve statutory services that 
are unwarranted and can be harmful (in terms of intrusive and stressful interventions and the uncertain 
outcomes of foster care) [135–137]. Furthermore, while many social work processes use groups to 
attempt to include a range of stakeholders, the influence of “group think” can also be negative, wherein 
group process can lead to a decision that reflects a desire for consensus rather than the best or most 
accurate decision. Current studies tend to ignore these cognitive processing issues, with many 
practitioners forced by working conditions to make decisions based on scanty information, under time 
pressure and in unstructured group decision-making contexts [24]. This impacts on decision 
variability, as without considered decisions and well-structured systems that support them, the internal 
variables of biases and values, the impact of a “wicked” learning environment, or “group think”, can 
become primary decision drivers, leading to increased variability. 
9. Conclusions 
This conceptual article discusses selected research as it applies to decision-making variability in the 
child protection realm. There are some omissions, as to discuss decision-reasoning is to discuss the 
entirety of the social context, and this is impossible to cover in an article. Nevertheless, this article 
raises many issues currently driving both between-country and within-country decision variation in 
response to child abuse and neglect. It highlights factors ranging from the macro to the micro, showing 
that orientations shape both external and internal variability. They contribute to variations in the ways 
that the causes of abuse are framed and highlight that child abuse remains subject to intense 
contestation as to its nature, consequences and best interventions. The impact of responsibilisation in 
neo-liberal environments, constructions of risk, responses to poverty and inequality, evidence-based 
practice, contestable views on abuse definitions and its causes and cognitive and systemic  
decision-making processes present intense challenges to decision consistency. I argue that despite this 
complex ecological context, finding ways to establish realistic decision systems and direct guidance is 
more desirable than ever. While concepts from either the “situated actor” of sociology or the 
naturalistic decision-maker from cognitive psychology are both useful ways to describe how decisions 
are made in context, neither offers guidance on how decisions should be made. To simply say that the 
environmental and cognitive issues at play are too complex brushes over the social justice issues at 
stake. One idea for developing realistic decision guides may be to develop complex case exemplars 
with annotation to highlight decision principles that would apply at each decision point and provide 
such exemplars for each type of child abuse, for each age of child. Attention to systems to ensure 
“kind” learning environments that enhance the development of sound professional discretion for 
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practitioners, as well as logical decision pathways embedded in organisational structures are also 
imperative. Continuing to emphasise critical reflection in social work education and practice is another 
important aspect of increasing consistency in decision-making, as is addressing the numerous 
organizational systems, cultural and processual elements of decision-making. However, in addition to 
these micro-meso solutions, settling the macro framing of child abuse and its ideological dimensions is 
crucial to improving decision variability. This must include the ongoing commitment of social work to 
address political and macro issues of access to resources and the harmful effects of neo-liberal 
individualisation. Ideally, this commitment would result in establishing decision-reasoning processes 
that acknowledge influences from all levels of the ecological approach on problem causation, as well 
as the ethical commitments that social work espouses.  
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